Force And Restraint In Strategic Deterrence: A Game-theorist's Perspective

by Roger B. Myerson

2021-01-12 20:50:26

A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation th... Read more
A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength. Less

Book Details

File size9.69 X 7.44 X 0.07 in
Print pages34
PublisherBiblioGov
Publication date November 1, 2012
LanguageEnglish
ISBN9781288242238
Roger B. Myerson is David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Chicago and recipient of the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.Edu...

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